Unanswered Questions
237 questions with no upvoted or accepted answers
6
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How does Fichte account for the existence of inter-subjective reality?
I have read many entries on Fichte online. There is never any reference to the question of the origin of inter-subjective reality. How do we apparently see the same world?
There does not seem to be ...
6
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4
answers
1k
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Has Spinoza been disproved by modern physics?
As I understood it Spinoza claims everything has Extension, it occupies space.
But in physics there are things called point particles which are zero dimensional, they don't occupy space.
So for ...
5
votes
3
answers
333
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Descartes Statement in Second Meditation is illogical?
In the second paragraph of Meditation Two: Concerning the Nature of the Human Mind: That it is better known than the Body, Descartes writes
“Therefore I suppose that everything I see is false. I ...
5
votes
5
answers
366
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What are an object's properties?
What can we consider an object's properties, for example, when can we consider an object's properties as 'changing'? For example, if I move an object from my desk to my table, has it changed? If I ...
5
votes
1
answer
376
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According to Aquinas, what is the relationship between the substantial form of a bodily being and its act of existing, ie. its esse?
Consider, for example, an existing bodily being. Because it is bodily, we know that it is composed of prime matter and substantial form. Also, because the bodily being is existing (not just made up in ...
4
votes
2
answers
125
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How do Thomists understand the efficient and final causes in planetary motion under Newtonian physics?
Under the influence of Newtonian physics Thomists have come to perceive the force of inertia and the force of gravity as the efficient cause of the planetary motion confining the final cause to things ...
4
votes
1
answer
104
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Is Aquinas's "act is the principle of action" a tautology?
In Summa Contra Gentiles II.6.7, Aquinas suddenly claims that "act is the principle of action" (actus autem actionis principium est).
Is this phrase supposed to be a definition of act? Or a ...
4
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0
answers
116
views
Understanding 'existence' and 'being' in debates about ordinary objects
Quine has brought forward his definition of existence: 'To be is to be the value of a bound variable.' But has also taught us that the sciences ultimately determine what actually exists contrary to ...
4
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1
answer
156
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Are there degrees of rationality/plausibility to assumptions?
There are many kinds of premises, in every possible field. I'll limit this question to metaphysics, although it can definitely be applied to each and every scientific/philosophical study.
For example,...
4
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0
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142
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On the distinction between "objecthood" and "knowability" in Kantian philosophy
What pre-Copernican philosophy treats as two distinct
matters-objecthood and knowability-are thus [in Kant's CPR] treated as
one.
[...]
In pre-Copernican philosophy, there is a clear ...
4
votes
1
answer
361
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Attributes of God in Spinoza’s “Ethics”
In Spinoza’s Ethics, he remarks that God/Nature has infinitely many attributes. However, in the Ethics, he only identifies and discusses two of these attributes: thought and extension, which account ...
4
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3
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195
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Is a purely abstract world possible?
This question is about the modal aspects of a purely abstract world. Can a possible world have no concrete instances of anything, only abstractions?
Specifically can such a world be seen as a possible ...
3
votes
0
answers
48
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Whitehead and Personalism
Is Alfred North Whitehead a Personalist? Some personalists say he's not, but I've read the SEP entry on Personalism, and it seems like he would be a Personalist.
3
votes
0
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52
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Can Husserl's impressions be mereologically expressible?
In Husserl's phenomenology, hyletic data (hylé, "matter") are the raw sensory impressions—such as colors, sounds, or textures—provided by "impressions" before being shaped by ...
3
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Talking about objects in mereological nihilism: correct but untrue?
Accodrding to T. Sider (p. 248–253)*, a distinction between truth and correctness is possible, such that for the mereological nihilist, statements about wholes can be untrue yet correct: ‘Correct ...