Unanswered Questions
412 questions with no upvoted or accepted answers
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Which systems of formal logic do not admit vacuous truth for universal statements?
As I understand it there are systems of formal logic that do not admit vacuous truth for universal statements, what known systems of formal logic satisfy this constraint?
An example Kripke as I ...
- 34k
4
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how to Hellman's structuralism preserve original mathematical practice for proof
I am reading Hellman’s Mathematics Without Numbers. I’ve read exactly up to page 26, and my understanding is roughly this: Hellman does not understand mathematical sentences as sentences about certain ...
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4
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What does Hegel mean by thought at the beginning of his Logic? Mere thinking or thought itself?
I presume that Logic in Hegel's system seeks an immanent and presupposition-free development of the basic categories of being and thought. Logic is therefore a theory of categories and a doctrine of ...
CommunityBot
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Is the difference between the quantum and the above-quantum levels of reality equivalent to the difference between nonadjunctive and adjunctive ∧?
Regarding the concept of non-adjunction w.r.t. many and various details, I would like to refer to sec. 4.4.1 of this very extensive text on arithmetic and non-classical logic. Generally, non-...
CommunityBot
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Contradictory unprovable statements in Tarski's "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages"
In Tarski's "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages", he glosses over the proof of a difficult lemma. I am looking for help writing a proof of it. In Tarski's notation, it is:
In ...
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4
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Looped Knower Paradox?
Before I ask my question, let me elaborate on why I have the question. Consider two versions of the Looped Liar paradox.
3-Member Liar paradox:
L1: L2 is false
L2: L3 is false
L3: L1 is false
Jourdain'...
- 440
4
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1
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Rewriting a set of propositions that includes a circular proposition
"For any proposition P, if I believe that P then this paragraph (everything that is written between the quotes) entails that I believe that P.
I believe that I exist.
For any proposition P, if I ...
CommunityBot
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Grice: Comparing Natural Meaning, Non-Natural Meaning, Conventional Implicature and Generalized Conversational Implicature
I am currently reading "Meaning" and "Logic and Conversation" by Paul Grice.
I find it a little difficult to differentiate clearly between his concepts "natural meaning", "non-natural meaning", "...
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4
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1
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Are there degrees of rationality/plausibility to assumptions?
There are many kinds of premises, in every possible field. I'll limit this question to metaphysics, although it can definitely be applied to each and every scientific/philosophical study.
For example,...
CommunityBot
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How can I explain the distribution of an O proposition's predicate?
A student raised a tough question while I was teaching formal fallacies: couldn't the statement that "some cats are not tabbies" be made with confidence upon seeing a single cat that is not a tabby? ...
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4
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Is a Thomist possible modal proposition a non-judicative proposition?
According to Thomist philosophy and logic, is a possible modal proposition (either divisive or compound) a non-judicative proposition? It would seem to me that the other three modal propositions (...
- 19.9k
4
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What questions or areas in the foundations of mathematics remain active research fields?
By foundations of mathematics I am referring to the mathematical, logical, and philosophical foundations of the subject. I'm interested in seeing which of these have active research going on within ...
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Can logical inference be based on non-contradiction?
In philosophy it was once common to claim that logical truths are based on the law of non-contradiction. Today it is more common to refer to modality, as in: an inference is deductive if the ...
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Is logical necessity relative to specific logics?
Logical necessity is usually captured by the semantic entailment relation ‘⊨’. That is, “B is necessary for A” usually is interpreted as A⊨B. However, the semantic entailment relation only makes sense ...
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Is it possible to define 'not(p)' in a deflationary theory of truth?
This question is a follow-up question to another recent question about deflationary theories of truth.
According to one comment:
The point of the deflationary account of truth is that there is ...
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